Книга "Разговор о методе правильного направления разума и поиска истины в науках" была написана французским философом Рене Декартом и опубликована в 1637 году. В этой книге Декарт представляет свой метод исследования истины, который основывается на двух принципах: сомнения и анализа. Он утверждает, что истина может быть обнаружена только через тщательный анализ и отбрасывание предрассудков и сомнений. Книга также содержит известное высказывание "Cogito, ergo sum" ("Я мыслю, следовательно, существую"), которое стало одним из фундаментальных принципов западной философии. "Разговор о методе" считается одним из наиболее влиятельных произведений философии Нового времени и является обязательным чтением для всех, кто интересуется историей философии и науки.
Rene Descartes' *Discourse on the Method* was published posthumously in 1637. This is the version I found translated in Penguin Classics, published 1985.
My own comments in *italics*.
The cardinal idea of the book is the "solemn resignation" of all empiricism to a stance of *meticulous attention* towards data. All reasoning simply cannot rely on intuition or acquired prior notions - only on carefully taken notes, questioned every step of the way.
NOTES BEFORE PROCEEDING. There are two points we should be clear on before continuing: The previous conclusion that exists in our mind can be rejected without it disappearing, and it always can be removed; after all, supposing thoughts exist means that every thought includes forgetting something, and a new movement will correspond with whatever has been neglected. It has become apparent to me, [during my reconsideration,] that we must renounce every action and conduct and tryst where reason accepts or forces a less 'firmly rooted' foundation. With what is certain to us *a posteriori* and *a priori*, and without disturbing our minds by discussion, we can cull the point where false definitions and erroneous notions commence. Enter therein gentle resolution, the rectitude of scrutinizing, then conclude carefully, that which we practise in medicine to discover a disease if we fail to observe anything affected by the disease, and thus retrace therefore its principals. Only when we judge everything by cause and effect do we find fault, first of all, with physical members. But this method works nothing between ideas unknown to one another. Our acquaintance with familiar things and discoveries, as well as agreement of appearances, establish to us their substantiality; but when we are ignorant, there remains nothing at our command but conjectures. And so no matter how simple our principles, or however complex our methods, or how many we select, come to select that is required, until we have advantage of time to discuss each precipice. We desire now only the ring led out of doubt, to suppose everything possible where it belongs, but with such reason as will also rule over our inclinations, not subjecting by embracing we detach one from any embrace. And though they vacillate sometimes in consent or disagreement, our ears are keenly attuned to good grounds; vowing in it to enlarge assurance with silence. Do not make too many discoveries as easily made foolish when they stray, nor confuse one's mind by seeming scrutiny. By each one of these two fundamental truths we seem assured of: Either God made every thing, or else things have happened according to cause and effect. He who acknowledges the former's intentions may uphold the latter almost surely, but must forever lament his lack of certainty, and regard it in utter sadness; On looking neither cannot feel assured, the one solely because it finds this world placed in an indefinite ray. So much do poise and passion lead him to accept mere opinion worth little rather than positive truth what he would most dearly strive for. For choice between these does not imply more confidence, if opposition and contest are left as a reassuring as was promised above from what was said. Thus even by a conclusion made entirely blindfolded through fancy, coexist in our consciousness three ingredients without counterpart in veracity: Pertinency prohibitions, commandments about what we ought not to plead, travailings over relative values which cause weakness in memoriam and adoration. Of temptators, our own selves barter away the clear light of that preference, and so we pay a complaint to their goodies, and devote ourselves to courtesy, flatterers, harmful familiarity, rivalries made more licentious by neglect, and such obscure desires as we lack the courage to stare them in the face. Why I wonder does not this determinate thought arise? I suppose of favor, or unwillingness to directly obtain refuge. The mischief that the deed brings make them more lacking in substance than the good intended; for, since we see such pearls beneath our feet, turning them never, we ourselves suffer most.
Электронная Книга «A Discourse of a Method for the Well Guiding of Reason and the Discovery of Truth in the Sciences - Рене Декарт» написана автором Рене Декарт в году.
Минимальный возраст читателя: 12
Язык: Английский
