Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience - P. M. S. Hacker

Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience by P.M. S. Hacker - это новое издание популярной книги в области нейронауки, которая стала классической работой по сравнению с первым изданием. Она представляет собой подробное обсуждение концептуальных путаниц, возникающих в различных нейронаучных и психологических теориях.

Первая глава книги повествует об источниках проблем в нейронауке. Во второй главе авторы фокусируются на философских концепциях и спорах, включая проблемы классического и материалистического подхода к физиологии мозга.

Отличной от вашей книгой является The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Автор: Shapiro & BelloЕсли книга незнакома вам, то вот краткие сведения о ней:

The 18 authors contributors to the Oxford Handbook present state-of-the-art approaches to the scope and method of philosophical inquiry on the emerging field of cognitive science, including work in philosophy of mind, cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, and philosophical aspects of neuroscience (Chalmers 2008b). The hybrid method of this handbook synthesises philosophical work in each area with the current scholarly findings, juxtaposing this work with online appendices that include journal articles and chapter summaries of major theories in these rapidly evolving fields. 

Handbooks are literature surveys edited according to a particular field or subject, which summarise past and present scholarship, analyze controversies, and suggest direction for further work. The Oxford Handbook meets all three shoulders of this definition with impeccable precision. A few words about each of those three features might help understand each individual contribution that the approximately 70 handsomely typeset essays compiled into this volume make up.

In many academic contexts, it is common practice to provide draft versions of books, upon request, as a means of soliciting broader feedback on ideas, before submitting manuscripts for publication. Positing such an average, though quicker, method in which reviewers used to actually read manuscripts contained in written form, apart from doing interviews with authors through Skype or over the phone, would be naive. As an engaging blog post André Abel points out, "In other words, we're exposing philosophers to Quora answers instead of waiting for their published books — one of the things that make philosophy so intellectually narcissistic. It undermines the integrity of philosophy. By analysing the arguments in an essay before they've even been written, you avoid deception and misinterpretation. You might as well ask the author to discuss themselves, their motives, any hermeneutical issues they think may have arisen during the writing process, etc, instead of writing the question-and-answer section yourself." Lasting projects such as The Yale Guide to Norms and Normativity do exist and potentially save a huge amount of time (I do not know if they actually do save significant time for most users; they are a goldmine for me, though), but they still rely on published manuscripts since their frequency of updates is limited; the presents snapshot of a field, along with hither-to unpublished essays, chapters, or lecture notes. To that end, there is value in submitting work in progress to such groups. 

At the very least, the distribution of proofed versions prior to publication allows researchers to amend, respond, and comment in ways unavailable to editors and reviewers of final manuscripts. Some scholars may prepare different versions for different audiences, making changes as they seek feedback from colleagues, peers, students, critics, and broader society. This serves to reveal to the interested community what researchers wish to claim authors rights or to object to about their own work. In other words, pre-publication versions of manuscripts enjoy several benefits over published documents. Preparation of pre-print versions can lead to improvements in research technique, strategy, design, language, organization, argumentation, stipulations, new positions, acknowledgments, crossed-out claims, filling-in potential positions or posting caveats, purpose of the document, structure of a document and so forth. Finally, according to website oss.com "many authors will submit their Manuscript Previews to Journals Multiple Times -- increasing your journal submission success greatly". But why, then, publish something at all (unless it's demanded of you by a cooperator)? Some essays or chapters in pre-prints appear to possess a res judicata that constrains discussion, criticism, revision, and derived materials. If something originally appeared in print, and if only the name of the author(s) had been changed, merely mentioning a citation to a previously appearing discussion or event either facilitates this, as authors may try to downplay superior prior scholarship familiar to others or restructure the starting position of a discourse to align better with earlier results, or defaults to producing variations on classical ideas verbatim rather than developing the idea in new ways. Focusing on these shortcomings, some recent commentators complain that "when other authors incorporate a classic paper into another text they carefully put it in context and voice. Many neuroethicists were shocked when others appropriated the Rawls (​1971​) article They Wear Many Hats without mentioning [his 1995 response]" (Hochschild, n.d.).

These arguments are, of course, valid, if somewhat scholastically stultifying or academic, thereby casting much cultural/philosophical activity as little more than mindless nail bashing. But I think, just as Blair Sitch suggests in his now-defunct blog Neurodiversity, "people can keep working at understanding each other while also disagreeing about what to believe (or why — imagine the Extraverts and Introverts Club — this is exactly how you'd describe the Second Mind)."

Just as shameless meta-referencing is the new optimism, each proposed essay thenceforth is simultaneously driven by and inserted in metareferential puns, a virile hermeneutics of contemporary discourse. Would I be judging the scholar who published dozens of roles the Turing Test before it was cold? Certainly. Instead, I would embrace the work as insightful, stimulating, and well-researched by the metrics of its own time and place. For when we engage a direct connection like this, we receive wallpapering insight as to past claims and future directions. When we make our minds adept at piecing together verifiable evidence from evasions and scintillating physics, we become more alive than ever before.

Электронная Книга «Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience» написана автором P. M. S. Hacker в году.

Минимальный возраст читателя: 0

Язык: Английский

ISBN: 9781119530633

The second edition of the seminal work in the field—revised, updated, and extended  In  Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience,  M.R. Bennett and P.M.S. Hacker outline and address the conceptual confusions encountered in various neuroscientific and psychological theories. The result of a collaboration between an esteemed philosopher and a distinguished neuroscientist, this remarkable volume presents an interdisciplinary critique of many of the neuroscientific and psychological foundations of modern cognitive neuroscience. The authors point out conceptual entanglements in a broad range of major neuroscientific and psychological theories—including those of such neuroscientists as Blakemore, Crick, Damasio, Dehaene, Edelman, Gazzaniga, Kandel, Kosslyn, LeDoux, Libet, Penrose, Posner, Raichle and Tononi, as well as psychologists such as Baar, Frith, Glynn, Gregory, William James, Weiskrantz, and biologists such as Dawkins, Humphreys, and Young. Confusions arising from the work of philosophers such as Dennett, Chalmers, Churchland, Nagel and Searle are subjected to detailed criticism. These criticisms are complemented by constructive analyses of the major cognitive, cogitative, emotional and volitional attributes that lie at the heart of cognitive neuroscientific research.  Now in its second edition, this groundbreaking work has been exhaustively revised and updated to address current issues and critiques. New discussions offer insight into functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), the notions of information and representation, conflict monitoring and the executive, minimal states of consciousness, integrated information theory and global workspace theory. The authors also reply to criticisms of the fundamental arguments posed in the first edition, defending their conclusions regarding mereological fallacy, the necessity of distinguishing between empirical and conceptual questions, the mind-body problem, and more. Essential as both a comprehensive reference work and as an up-to-date critical review of cognitive neuroscience, this landmark volume:  Provides a scientifically and philosophically informed survey of the conceptual problems in a wide variety of neuroscientific theories Offers a clear and accessible presentation of the subject, minimizing the use of complex philosophical and scientific jargon Discusses how the ways the brain relates to the mind affect the intelligibility of neuroscientific research Includes fresh insights on mind-body and mind-brain relations, and on the relation between the notion of person and human being Features more than 100 new pages and a wealth of additional diagrams, charts, and tables Continuing to challenge and educate readers like no other book on the subject, the second edition of  Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience  is required reading not only for neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers, but also for academics, researchers, and students involved in the study of the mind and consciousness.